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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE:
A PROPOSAL TO BALANCE EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE INTERESTS
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is the theory by which a court crafts
a covenant not to compete even though an employee never signed such an
agreement.1 Although a court first employed the concept of inevitable
disclosure over thirty years ago,2 subsequent courts have rarely addressed
this doctrine.3 In PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,4 however, the Seventh Circuit
brought renewed attention to inevitable disclosure injunctions.5
This Note examines the emergence of the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure. In so doing, Part I discusses the validity requirements courts
impose on covenant not to compete. Part II defines the elements of inevitable
disclosure, and Part III considers its historical development. Part IV discusses
the Seventh Circuit’s PepsiCo decision and that case’s possible expansion of
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. Part V considers the conflicting public
policies involved in inevitable disclosure injunctions. Finally, Part VI
proposes a test for applying the doctrine that balances an employee’s
fundamental right to pursue his profession with an employer’s vital interest
in protecting his trade secrets.
1. See Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829, 836 (S.D. Ohio, 1978) (observing that
when enjoining a former employee from assuming new employment, a court is “in effect, writing a
covenant not to compete”).
2. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g. Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654
(E.D. Mich. 1966).
3. See PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d
1199 (7th Cir. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Varco Int’l, 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982); Emory Indus., Inc. V.
Cottler, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. PMC Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 852
(E.D. Mich. 1999); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94-C6838, 1996 WL 3965 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1996);
Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., Civ.
3-91-630, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406, (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991); Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear
Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989); A.B. Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d
854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Air Prods. & Chems. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super Ct. 1982).
4. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995)
5. See Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a Former
Employee Who Never Signed a Non-Compete Agreement Threatened to Use or Disclose Trade Secrets
be Prohibited from Working for a Competitor?, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 211, 224-28 (1997).
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I. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Generally, courts disfavor restraints on employment and examine a
covenant not to compete with a high degree of scrutiny.6 Courts naturally
hesitate to enforce such an agreement due to the extreme hardships it places
on an employee’s ability to compete in the marketplace.7 Courts also are
suspicious of these covenants due to the perceived inequality of bargaining
power between an employer and an employee.8 Generally, courts uphold a
covenant not to compete only when it protects an employer’s legitimate
interest, is reasonable, and does not violate public policy.9 The primary factor
in determining whether a covenant not to compete is valid is the
reasonableness of its terms.10 A covenant is unreasonable if the restraints
imposed are greater than necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate
interest, or if the potential hardship to the employee outweighs the
employer’s need.11
6. See Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965) (observing that
contractual restraints placed upon employment are “looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered,
and carefully scrutinized”).
7. See AMP, 823 F.2d at 1202 (“‘[T]he right of an individual to follow and pursue the particular
occupation for which he is best trained is a most fundamental right . . . . Restraints cannot be lightly
placed upon his right to compete in the area of his greatest worth.’”) quoting ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott,
273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 1971).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188, cmt. g (1981). This comment observes
that courts closely scrutinize restraints upon employment because an employee is likely to agree to
such a restriction without considering “the hardship he may later suffer through loss of his livelihood.”
Id. Courts have mirrored the Restatement in their treatment of covenants not to compete. For example,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Bennett, when considering a covenant not to compete, observed
that courts are influenced by a “concern for the average individual employee who as a result of his
unequal bargaining power may be found in oppressive circumstances. 134 N.W.2d at 899. While
quoting Menter Co. v. Brock, 180 N.W. 553, 555, (Minn. 1920), the Bennett court noted that a person
who is in urgent need of employment is unlikely to object to the terms of a contract if the wages are
reasonable. See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 899.
9. See Bennett, 134 N.W.2d at 898.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981) (“A promise is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.”).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1) (1981).
Even if the restraint is no greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s interest, the promisee’s
need may be outweighed by the harm to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. In the
case of a sale of a business, the harm caused to the seller may be excessive if the restraint
necessitates his complete withdrawal from business; the likely injury to the public may be too
great if it has the effect of removing a former competitor from competition.... In the case of a post-
employment restraint, the harm caused to the employee may be excessive if the restraint inhibits
his personal freedom by preventing him from earning his livelihood if he quits; the likely injury to
the public may be too great if it is seriously harmed by the impairment of his economic mobility or
by the unavailability of the skills developed in his employment....Not every restraint causes injury
to the public, however, and even a post-employment restraint may increase efficiency by
encouraging the employer to entrust confidential information to the employee.
Id. § 188 cmt. c.
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When determining the reasonableness of a covenant not to compete,
courts examine the restraints placed by the covenant on types of employment
activity, geographical area, and time.12 If a covenant restrains types of
employment activity, geographic area, or time more extensively than
necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate interests, courts deem that
covenant to be unreasonable.13 When examining a covenant’s restraints on
employment activity, courts consider the following: “the employee’s
bargaining power in the employment market; the likelihood of grievous harm
to the employee if the clause is enforced; the amount of access the employee
had to the employer’s business secrets and future plans; and the amount of
access the employee had to the employer’s customers.”14 Generally, a
covenant unreasonably restricts geographic area if it affects an area larger
than where the employee actually worked or the area covered by the
employer’s business.15 In addition, a covenant is unreasonable in duration if
it operates longer than necessary to remove perceived customer connections
between the employer and employee, or if it lasts longer than necessary for
an employee’s successor to replace licenses and learn the basic job duties.16
In addition, most courts require that adequate consideration support a
covenant not to compete.17 A majority of courts hold that where an employee
agreed to such a covenant at the inception of the employment relationship,
the employer’s initial promise of employment provides sufficient
12. Comment d to § 188 of the Restatement states:
The extent of the restraint is a critical factor in determining its reasonableness. The extent may be
limited in three ways: by type of activity, by geographical area, and by time. If the promise
proscribes types of activity more extensive than necessary to protect those engaged in by the
promisee, it goes beyond what is necessary to protect his legitimate interests and is unreasonable.
If it covers a geographical area more extensive than necessary to protect his interests, it is also
unreasonable. And if the restraint is to last longer than is required in light of those interests, taking
account of such factors as the permanent or transitory nature of technology and information, it is
unreasonable. Since, in any of these cases, the restraint is too broad to be justified by the
promisee’s need, a court may hold it to be unreasonable without the necessity of weighing the
countervailing interests of the promisor and the public. What limits as to activity, geographical
area, and time are appropriate in a particular case depends on all the circumstances.
Id. § 188 cmt. d.
13. See id.
14. John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 155 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
15. See id. at 156.
16. See id.
17. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Sufficiency of Consideration for Employee’s Covenant
Not to Compete, Entered into After Inception of Employment, 51 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973). See, e.g., Curtis
1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 945-47 (7th Cir. 1994); Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578
F.2d 1264, 1267 (8th Cir. 1978); National Risk Management, Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 429
(E.D. Pa. 1993); Gagliardi Bros., Inc. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Millard
Maintenance Serv., Co. v. Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ill. App. ct. 1990).
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consideration to support the covenant not to compete.18 However, if the
employee agreed to the covenant at any point after the inception of
employment, many courts will enforce the covenant only if the employer
gave the employee consideration beyond the mere continuance of the
employment relationship.19 Courts reason that because a covenant not to
compete constitutes a contract, consideration must support the contract at the
time it is made. If an employee enters into a covenant after the inception of
employment without receiving additional consideration, the restrictive
contract is not supported by consideration, and thus the contract is invalid
under basic contract law principles.20 Courts have held that sufficient
additional consideration could be in the form of a raise, a new position, or an
increased employment term.21
II. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, a court may enjoin an
employee from assuming a new job even though the employee never signed
a covenant not to compete with his former employer.22 This doctrine is so
named because employers base an inevitable disclosure claim on the theory
that a former employee will inevitably disclose the former employer’s trade
secrets in the performance of his new job.23 Courts following this doctrine
will enjoin an employee from assuming new employment if the employer
demonstrates three elements: (1) that the employee had access to a legitimate
trade secret; (2) that the employee will inevitably disclose that trade secret in
the performance of his new job; and (3) that the disclosure of that trade secret
will cause irreparable harm to the former employer.24 If the former employer
18. See Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of
Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 795 (1996). See, e.g., National Risk Management, 819 F.
Supp. at 429 (“‘When the restrictive covenant is contained in the initial contract of employment,
consideration is the job itself.’” (quoting Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 314 A.2d 279, 282
(Pa. 1974))). But see 51 A.L.R.3d at 833-35 (observing that some courts require consideration in
addition to the mere continuance of employment in order for a covenant not to compete to be
enforceable).
19. See Wessman, supra note 18, at 795. See also Modern Controls, 578 F.2d. at 1267 (holding
that a covenant not to compete that is not ancillary to the initial employment contract “can be sustained
only if it is supported by independent consideration”). But see Curtis 1000, 24 F.3d at 947 (finding that
when a covenant not to compete is signed after an at-will employee began work, continued
employment for a substantial period is sufficient consideration for the covenant).
20. See National Risk Management, 819 F. Supp. at 429.
21. Modern Controls, 578 F.2d at 1267.
22. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 211-12.
23. See id. at 212.
24. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94-C6838, 1996 WL 3965 (N.D. Ill Jan. 2, 1996)
(granting injunction against former employee after finding the existence of trade secrets, the
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proves these three elements, a court will prohibit a former employee from
working for any of the employer’s competitors. Using this doctrine, the court
restrains an employee in the same manner as if the employee had signed a
reasonable covenant not to compete. Consequently, the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure essentially acts as a judicially crafted covenant not to compete.25
For a court to grant an inevitable disclosure injunction, the former
employer must prove that a genuine trade secret exists.26 A court may turn to
several sources to determine if a  trade secret exists. For example, some
courts have used section 757 of the First Restatement of Torts27 and its
definition of trade secrets.28 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act also provides a
definition of trade secrets.29 In addition, some courts have looked to state
inevitability of disclosure of those secrets by the defendant, and irreparable harm if those trade secrets
were to be disclosed). See also AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202-07 (7th Cir. 1987)
(considering the existence of trade secrets, the alleged inevitability of disclosure, and the claimed
irreparable harm from that disclosure when evaluating a former employer’s inevitable disclosure
claim); Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (granting an injunction after
finding the existence of trade secrets in ozone technology, a present threat of disclosure of those trade
secrets, and potential damages that could not be ascertainable in terms of money).
25. See Emery Indus., 202 U.S.P.Q. at 836 (observing that when enjoining a former employee
from assuming new employment, a court is “in effect, writing a covenant not to compete”).
26. See AMP, 823 F.2d at 1202. In AMP, the court held that due to the absence of a noncompete,
a plaintiff’s first requirement in an inevitable disclosure case is “to establish the existence of genuine
trade secrets.” Id. The court noted that where there is a valid noncompete signed between the parties,
the court will afford broad protection to the employer by protecting not only genuine trade secrets but
also generalized confidential business information. See id. The court determined that, absent a
restrictive covenant, courts will protect only genuine trade secrets. See id. at 1204. The court stated
that “‘the right to impose contractual restraints does not render the same knowledge ‘trade secrets’ in
the absence of such restraints.’” Id. quoting Flem Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 511 (N.D. Ill.
1985). The court further held that absent a covenant not to compete, “a court will not raise to trade
secret status ‘the fruits of ordinary experience in . . . business, thus compelling former employees to
reinvent the wheel as the price for entering the competitive market.’” Id. at 1206 (quoting Fleming,
611 F. Supp. at 515).
27. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Comment b states:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process
of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list
of customers . . . . A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the
business.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (stating that a trade secret is
“any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others”).
28. See, e.g., Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114, 1121-22 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939) in determining the definition of
“trade secret”).
29. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) defines “trade secret” as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
Washington University Open Scholarship
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common law when defining a trade secret.30 Under all of these sources,
information that constitutes trade secrets must possess economic value and
be unknown to the employer’s competitors. In addition, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act adds the requirement that an employer has taken reasonable
precautions to maintain the secrecy of the information.31
For a court to grant an injunction prohibiting a former employee from
assuming a new job, the former employer must also prove that an employee
will inevitably disclose the employer’s trade secrets in the performance of his
or her new job duties.32 When determining the inevitability of disclosure,
courts will consider the degree of similarity between the employee’s old and
new job responsibilities.33 Courts will also evaluate the extent of an
employee’s access to trade secrets, as well as the nature and useful life of
those trade secrets.34 In addition, courts will examine the level of competition
between the former and new employer,35 and the extent to which the trade
secrets have given the former employer an advantage over the new
employer.36 Finally, a court may consider whether the new employer has
taken steps to prevent the former employee from disclosing his former
employer’s trade secrets.37
In addition to proving that the former employee will inevitably disclose
trade secrets to his new employer, the former employer must also
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
30. See, e.g., AMP, 823 F.2d at 1202 (defining “trade secrets as ‘a plan or process, tool,
mechanism, compound, or informational data utilized by a person in his business operations and
known only to him and such limited other persons to whom it may be necessary to confide it’”
(quoting ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971))).
31. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4); Matheson, supra note 14, at 148-49.
32. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 216. see also Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829,
835 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (granting an injunction after finding that, absent an injunction, it would be
“virtually impossible for the defendant to perform his prospective duties” without disclosing his
former employer’s trade secrets); Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353,
356-57 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that an injunction was improper because the plaintiff had not
demonstrated that the defendant would inevitably disclose his former employer’s trade secrets).
33. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94-C6838, 1996 WL 3965, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1996).
See also Emery Indus. 202 U.S.P.Q. at 834 (concluding that a present threat of disclosure exists when
the former employer and new employer are direct competitors and when the employee’s job
responsibilities are comparable).
34. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 216.
35. See Emery Indus., 202 U.S.P.Q. at 834; PepsiCo, 1996 WL 3965, at *20.
36. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 216.
37. See PepsiCo, 1996 WL 3965, at *20; IBM Corp. v. Seagate, Civ. No. 3-91-630, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20406, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991) (observing that courts, when evaluating a claim of
threatened disclosure, will consider “the actions the new employer has taken to prevent the former
employee from using or disclosing trade secrets of the former employer”).
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demonstrate that it will be irreparably harmed by such disclosure.38
Irreparable harm occurs when the disclosure of trade secrets results in harm
to the former employer that cannot be remedied by money damages.39 This
lack of a monetary remedy exists because “it is often difficult [if not
impossible] to calculate the true extent of the loss” created by trade secret
disclosure.40 Some courts issuing inevitability injunctions reason that a
former employer should not have to await the disclosure of trade secrets
before becoming entitled to seek an inadequate remedy of money damages.41
While most courts require more than a mere showing of inevitable
disclosure of trade secrets to warrant a finding of irreparable harm, the
district court in PepsiCo v. Redmond found that the inevitable disclosure of a
plaintiff’s trade secrets provided an independently sufficient ground to
demonstrate irreparable harm.42 Specifically, the district court in PepsiCo,
held that “where trade secrets and confidential information are at
issue, . . . irreparable harm flows necessarily from the actual or threatened
loss of the important protectible business interests at stake. Therefore, a
preliminary injunction is the only remedy adequate to curtail the irreparable
harm that would otherwise inevitably flow.”43 Part IV of this Note discusses
this break in precedent, which could potentially expand the availability of an
inevitable disclosure injunction to former employers.44
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth,45 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
American Potash & Chemical Corp.,46 and Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
38. See AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987) IBM, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20406, at *12 (holding that a former employer must establish a threat of irreparable harm in
order to receive an injunction).
39. See Vogel v. American Soc. of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1984); PepsiCo, 1996
WL 3965, at *29 (holding that irreparable harm occurs when a “plaintiff is unlikely to be made whole
by an award of damages or other relief at the end of the trial”).
40. PepsiCo, 1996 WL 3965, at *29. See also Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829,
833 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (findings that the disclosure of a former employer’s trade secrets will cause
irreparable harm, as that disclosure “will cause the plaintiff damages which will not be ascertainable in
terms of money”).
41. See A.B. Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 854, 859-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Smith
v. Weistein Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
42. PepsiCo., 1996 WL 3965, at *29.
43. See id. at *30.
44. See infra notes 103-126 and accompanying text.
45. 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
46. 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
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Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp.47 are the three cases that
first established the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.48 In B.F. Goodrich, the
plaintiff, B.F. Goodrich, spent nearly thirty years researching and developing
high altitude, full-pressure space suits.49 The defendant, Donald
Wohlgemuth, worked for B.F. Goodrich as an engineer engaged in the
design and development of space suits.50 During a period of eight years,
Wohlgemuth rose to the position of manager of the department in charge of
space suit development.51 Over the course of his employment with B.F.
Goodrich, Wohlgemuth learned many trade secrets concerning the
production of space suits.52 Because Wohlgemuth supervised practically all
space suit research at B.F. Goodrich, he possessed detailed knowledge of the
majority of the scientific and engineering principles involved in the
production of B.F. Goodrich’s space suits.53
In 1962, Wohlgemuth accepted a job offer from International Latex
Corporation, which also produced space suits.54 Shortly thereafter, B.F.
Goodrich sought a permanent injunction prohibiting Wohlgemuth from
performing any work for any other employer relating to the design or
manufacture of space suits.55 Although Wohlgemuth had never signed a
covenant not to compete, B.F. Goodrich claimed the necessity of injunction
because Wohlgemuth, if unrestrained, would disclose the company’s trade
secrets.56 B.F. Goodrich relied on Wohlgemuth’s statements, in which he
declared that “loyalty and ethics had their price; insofar as he was concerned,
International Latex was paying the price.”57
47. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
48. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 215.
49. See B.F. Goodrich, 192 N.E.2d at 102.
50. See id. at 101-102.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 102. The court noted that Wohlgemuth was one of a few top executives in the
company’s space suit program. See id. In this capacity, Wohlgemuth oversaw almost all of the
company’s research in space suit development. See id. at 102-03. During his employment, he approved
suit designs and modifications, approved changes in manufacturing specifications and operating
procedures, and reviewed technical designs to comply with customer specifications. See id. at 103.
Due to this in-depth involvement in the company’s space suit development program, the court found
that Wohlgemuth had full knowledge a large number of trade secrets, and in fact, was involved in the
creation of many of these trade secrets. See id. at 103.
53. See id. at 102-03.
54. See id. at 102. Prior to making an offer to Wohlgemuth, International Latex had acquired a
contract from NASA to develop a space suit for Project Apollo.
55. See id. at 103.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 104. Wohlgemuth made these remarks to coworkers at B.F. Goodrich in response to a
question about his company loyalty and ethics. See id. On another occasion, Wohlgemuth stated that
“[o]nce he was a member of the Latex Team, he would expect to use all of the knowledge that he had
to their benefit.” Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that a “substantial threat of
disclosure” existed, and therefore granted B.F. Goodrich’s request for an
injunction.58 The court reasoned that the circumstances surrounding
Wohlgemuth’s hiring by Latex International, as well as the remarks he made
to co-workers, sufficiently established a substantial threat of disclosure.59 The
court also noted that irreparable harm would occur through the disclosure of
the plaintiff’s trade secrets, as B.F. Goodrich would have no adequate
remedy at law in the event of such disclosure.
Although the B.F. Goodrich court never adopted the term “inevitable
disclosure,” this case is important in the history of the doctrine because it
enjoined an employee from assuming his new job duties despite the absence
of a covenant not to compete. This case is also significant because it held that
the existence of a covenant not to compete is not necessary for a court to
enjoin a former employee from assuming a new job.60
In E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Co.,61
the plaintiff, duPont, was engaged in the production of pigments using a
specific chloride process.62 At the time of trial, duPont was the only pigment
manufacturer to develop successfully this chloride process.63 For nearly
seven years, the defendant Donald E. Hirsch worked for duPont on the
lengthy and expensive development of the chloride process.64 In 1962,
defendant American Potash & Chemical Corp. (“Potash”), began to recruit
personnel for a new plant that manufactured pigments with a chloride
process.65 Potash recruited Hirsch who then resigned from duPont and
accepted a position with Potash to work at the new plant.66
Shortly thereafter, duPont sought and received a restraining order
prohibiting Hirsch from engaging in any work for Potash in the operation or
development of a chloride process for pigments.67 Defendants Hirsch and
58. See id. at 105. The court held that “equitable intervention is sanctioned when it appears, as it
does in the instant case, that there exists a present real threat of disclosure, even without actual
disclosure.”
59. See id. at 104-05.
60. See id. at 105.
61. 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
62. See id. at 430.
63. See id.
64. See id. During the last year of Hirsch’s employment with duPont, he was an important
member of a group advising on the design of a new commercial plant to be used solely for the
production of pigments by the chloride process. See id. One responsibility of this group was to
incorporate duPont’s latest chloride process technology into the new plant’s operations. See id. at 433.
65. See id. at 431.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 429. During Hirsch’s employment with duPont, he did not sign a covenant not to
compete. See id. at 430. He had, however, sign a confidentiality agreement. See id.
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Potash filed a motion for summary judgment.68 In response to this motion,
duPont offered evidence that Hirsch would inevitably disclose trade secrets
concerning the chloride process.69 Furthermore, duPont claimed that
evidence of such inevitable disclosure would support, without more,
injunctive relief because the threat of unlawful disclosure is implicit in the
factual circumstances.70 In opposition, the defendants asserted that courts
should not consider the inevitability of a trade secret’s disclosure when
determining the existence of threatened trade secret disclosure.71
Although not expressly holding that an injunction could ensue from a
mere showing of inevitable disclosure, the court held that “the degree of
probability of disclosure, whether amounting to inevitability or not, is a
relevant factor to be considered in determining whether a ‘threat’ of
disclosure exists.”72 The court, after finding that the defendants failed to meet
their burden of foreclosing the possibility of the trial court’s finding a
substantial threat of unlawful disclosure, denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, and thus upheld the restraining orders against the
defendants.73
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation &
Engineering Corp.74 is the first case in which a court enjoined an employee
from assuming his new job duties based solely on a finding that the employee
would “inevitably disclose” a former employer’s trade secrets.75 The
plaintiff, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. (“Allis-Chalmers”),
manufactured diesel engines and made great strides in the development of a
distributor-pump fuel injection system for such engines.76 At the time of trial,
only three companies marketed a distributor pump because that particular
type of pump was very difficult to design and manufacture.77 Moreover,
68. See id. at 431.
69. See id. at 432.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 436.
72. Id.
73. See id. The court cited Goodrich in holding that courts will grant appropriate relief upon a
finding that a threat of disclosure exists. The court also noted that trade secrets concerning the chloride
process did indeed exist, and that the disclosure of those trade secrets would cause damage that was
not adequately compensable by a legal remedy. Id. at 432. The court further observed that the
defendant had conceded that instances could arise where there could be a conflict between his new job
duties and his duty not to disclose the plaintiff’s trade secrets. In addition, the defendant had discussed
the possibility of this conflict of interest with several of the plaintiff’s employees. Id. at 434-35.
74. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
75. See id. at 654.
76. See id. at 649-50.
77. See at 648. The court noted that at least eight companies had attempted and failed to
successfully produce a distributor type pump. See id.
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Allis-Chalmers’ distributor pump possessed significant advantages over the
other pumps available on the market.78
George D. Wolff, the defendant, worked as the head of Allis-Chalmers’
fuel systems laboratory.79 In that capacity, he was responsible for all research
and testing on the pump and consequently was familiar with all aspects of the
pump’s design and manufacture.80 In November 1965, defendant Continental
Aviation & Engineering Corp. (“Continental”) received a government
contract to develop a fuel injection distributor pump for the production of a
battle tank engine.81 The manufacture of this fuel injection system required
the development of a distributor type pump. On December 15, 1965, Wolff
terminated his employment with Allis-Chalmers and began employment at
Continental staring January 3, 1966.82 Wolff’s immediate responsibilities at
Continental involved working on the fuel injection system for the proposed
battle tank and developing a distributor pump.83
Allis-Chalmers sought and received a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Wolff from engaging in any work for Continental on the
development of fuel injection pumps.84 The district court found that Allis-
Chalmers possessed trade secrets85 and that “there is an inevitable and
imminent danger of disclosure of Allis-Chalmers trade secrets to
Continental.”86 While the court noted that the mere suspicion of injury alone
does not warrant the “extraordinary remedy” of an injunction, the court
nevertheless granted the injunction. The injunction prohibited Wolff from
working on Continental’s distributor pump development because it would be
virtually impossible for Wolff to perform his duties at Continental without
78. See id. at 649. These advantages included:
projected cost of production; more efficient use of parts; better timing of injection in a less
complex manner; more efficient use of gears and savings on parts; more efficient use of parts in
the governor mechanism; larger reach than anything that could be obtained from commercially
available pumps; better behavior on cavitation erosion tests; and more compact design because it
is driven at engine speed.
Id.
79. See id. at 650.
80. See id. The court noted that not only did Wolff possess knowledge of many trade secrets
concerning the pump, his name was also listed as the inventor on five patent applications relating to
the design improvements and development of the pump. See id.
81. See id. at 647.
82. See id. at 651. Wolff began negotiation with Continental in June, 1965 and ultimately
accepted its offer of employment in October, 1965. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 646.
85. See id. at 654. The court stated that the plaintiff possessed “confidential, proprietary
information relating to development, design and manufacture of distributor type fuel injection pumps,
which constitute trade secrets and are protectible as such.” Id.
86. See id.
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disclosing Allis-Chalmers’ trade secrets.87
In the years following these three cases, few courts have addressed the
inevitable disclosure doctrine.88 From these decisions, two distinct versions
of the doctrine developed: a weak version and a strong version.89
Courts employ the weaker version of the doctrine when basing an
injunction not only upon a finding of inevitable disclosure of a trade secret,
but also “an overt act imperiling trade secrets or some other explanation for
why misappropriation is not speculative.”90 Such showing can be manifest by
the statements of the employee, such as in B.F. Goodrich, where the
defendant stated that “loyalty and ethics had their price.” and the new
employer “was paying the price.”91 This is the weak version of the doctrine
because the injunction is based on a more than mere finding of inevitable
disclosure of a trade secret.92
In contrast, courts employ the strong version of the doctrine when basing
an injunction solely upon a finding of inevitable disclosure.93 Such was the
case in Allis-Chalmers, where the court enjoined the defendant from
assuming his new job solely on the theory that he would inevitably disclose
the plaintiff’s trade secrets.94
87. See id. The court based its findings of inevitable disclosure on the following factors: “The
course of negotiations, relating to distributor type fuel injection pumps, between Allis-Chalmers and
Continental, the nature of the research and development work done by Mr. Wolff on distributor type
fueling pumps at Allis-Chalmers, [and] the nature of the type of work Mr. Wolff is to perform at
Continental.”
88. See AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Varco Int’l,
Inc., 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982); Hoskins Mfg. Co. v. PMC Corp., 47 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1999); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F.Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear
Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Emery Indus. Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q.
829 (S.D. Ohio 1978); A.B. Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Air Prods.
& Chems. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
89. See Bradford P. Lyerla, Thirteen Rules for Inevitable Disclosure Trials, COMPUTER LAW,
June 1998, at 10, 10. This article is an invaluable tool for any attorney confronted with an inevitable
disclosure issue. The author of this article is an attorney who has represented clients in a number of
inevitable disclosure cases, including PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
90. Id.
91. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). Another court
made a similar finding in PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1262. In PepsiCo, the court affirmed the district court’s
finding that the defendant, Redmond, was untruthful to his former employer concerning the status of
his employment negotiations with his prospective employer, and that this lack of candor demonstrated
that Redmond could not be trusted to act “with the necessary sensitivity and good faith” in not using
PepsiCo trade secrets. See id. at 1270-01.
92. See Lyerla, supra note 89, at 10.
93. See id.
94. See Allis-Chalmers, Mfg. Co. v Continental Aviation Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654 (E.D.
Mich. 1966). See also Emery Indus. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829, 835-36 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (granting a
temporary injunction based solely upon a finding that “an inevitable and imminent danger of
disclosure of plaintiff’s trade secrets” existed).
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In almost all inevitable disclosure cases prior to PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond,95 the trade secrets at issue involved some matter of science,
technology, or engineering. For example, in B.F. Goodrich, duPont, and
Allis-Chalmers, the defendants developed technological trade secrets to
achieve leadership in their respective industries.96 Furthermore, in all three
cases, the defendant employees accepted employment with a new company
to work on the same technology through which their former employers had
acquired their industry leadership.97 Therefore, nearly all of the inevitable
disclosure cases prior to PepsiCo involved unusual circumstances involving
the disclosure of a former employer’s specific scientific, technological, or
engineering trade secrets to a competitor of that employer.98
IV. PEPSICO V. REDMOND
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in PepsiCo v. Redmond99 potentially
expands the instances in which a former employer may seek the protection of
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. The case involved a trade secret
controversy between plaintiff PepsiCo, maker of the drink All Sport;
defendant Quaker Oats Company (Quaker Oats), maker of Gatorade and
Snapple; and defendant William E. Redmond, former employee of
PepsiCo.100 From 1984 until 1994, Redmond worked for PepsiCo and
eventually advanced to general manager of the business unit which covered
all of California.101 On November 8, 1994, Redmond accepted a job offer
from Quaker Oats to become the Vice President of On-Premise Sales for
Gatorade.102
On November 16, 1994, the district court granted a temporary restraining
order enjoining Redmond from assuming his duties at Quaker Oats.103 At the
preliminary injunction hearing that followed, PepsiCo identified four trade
secrets that it claimed Redmond possessed and would inevitably disclose.104
95. 54 F.3d 1262.
96. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 223.
97. See id. at 223.
98. Id. But see Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Supp. Ct. 1982)
(examining a inevitable disclosure claim where the trade secrets involved consisted of pricing plans).
99. 54 F.3d 1262.
100. See id. at 1263.
101. See id. at 1264.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1265. The restraining order also enjoined Redmond from disclosing trade secrets
and confidential information to Quaker Oats. See id. However, two days after granting the order, the
court dissolved the order sua sponte “after determining that PepsiCo had failed to meet its burden of
establishing that it would suffer irreparable harm.” Id.
104. See id. at 1265-66.
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First, PepsiCo pointed to its “Strategic Plan for Pepsi-Cola North
America(“PCNA”),” which contained “PCNA’s plans to compete, its
financial goals, and its strategies for manufacturing, production, marketing,
packaging, and distribution for the coming three years.”105 Second, PepsiCo
identified PCNA’s “Annual Operating Plan,” which consisted of “PCNA’s
financial goals, marketing plans, promotional event calendars, growth
expectations, and operational changes in that year.”106 Third, PepsiCo offered
evidence of PCNA’s “attack plans” for specific markets where PCNA
planned to spend extra money to promote its brands.107 Finally, PepsiCo
identified “PCNA trade secrets regarding innovations in its selling and
delivery systems.”108 PepsiCo asserted that an injunction was necessary to
protect these trade secrets because Redmond would inevitably rely on those
secrets when making decisions about Gatorade’s price structure, distribution
systems, packaging, and marketing.109 Finding a clear threat of trade secret
misappropriation, the district court enjoined Redmond from assuming his
position at Quaker Oats through May 1995.110
On appeal, the defendants argued that a court could not grant an
injunction based solely upon a theory of inevitable disclosure.111 The Seventh
Circuit, however, held that “a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret
misappropriation by demonstrating that a defendant’s new employment will
inevitably lead him to rely on plaintiff’s trade secrets.”112 The court
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Redmond would inevitably disclose PepsiCo’s trade secrets.113 The court
105. Id. at 1265.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1266.
109. See id. PepsiCo further claimed that disclosure of these secrets would give Gatorade “an
unfair advantage in its upcoming skirmishes with PepsiCo.” Id.
110. See id. at 1267. The district court also permanently enjoined Redmond from using or
disclosing any PepsiCo trade secrets or confidential information.
111. See id. at 1269.
112. Id. In so holding, the court cited both AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.
1987) and Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268-69. In both AMP and Teradyne, the courts rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a
former employee would inevitably disclose the plaintiff’s trade secrets. See AMP, 823 F.2d at 1207;
Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 356. By considering whether disclosure was indeed likely, however, both
decisions gave support to the theory that an employee could be enjoined upon a showing of inevitable
disclosure. This fact is demonstrated by PepsiCo, in which the court affirmed an injunction after
finding that the facts in this case rose above those of Teradyne and PepsiCo, such as to necessitate an
injunction. See 54 F.3d at 1269-71.
113. See id. at 1271. In its reasoning, the court observed that “PepsiCo finds itself in the position
of a coach, one of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big
game.” Id. at 1270.
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also noted that PepsiCo was not a traditional trade secret case, i.e., one “in
which a former employee has knowledge of a special manufacturing process
or customer list and can give a competitor an unfair advantage by transferring
the technology or customers to that competitor.”114 Nevertheless, the court
found that although inevitable disclosure may arise less often than the case of
stolen trade secrets, this situation still fell within the boundaries of trade
secret protection.115 After upholding the district court’s finding of inevitable
disclosure, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the injunction.116
PepsiCo appeared to broaden the doctrine of inevitable disclosure,117 as
the trade secrets protected did not relate to science, technology, or
engineering, but involved pricing, distribution, packaging, and marketing.118
The threat of disclosure for these types of trade secrets may be viewed as a
weaker case than protection of scientific, technological, or engineering
processes.119 By affirming an injunction to protect these arguably weaker
types of trade secrets, the court potentially broadened the situations in which
employers can use this doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit further expanded the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
by its treatment of the element of irreparable harm. Although the court
examined the existence of trade secrets and the inevitability of those trade
secrets’ disclosure, the court failed to address whether PepsiCo would suffer
irreparable harm from Redmond’s inevitable disclosure of those trade
secrets.120 The court’s failure to discuss irreparable harm represents a sharp
break in precedent because previous courts considering inevitable disclosure
injunctions required a demonstration of irreparable harm.121 By upholding
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1271-72. It is important to note that both the district court and the Seventh Circuit
placed reliance on the fact that Redmond had demonstrated a lack of candor when discussing his job
status with PepsiCo employees. See id. at 1270-71. Because of this dishonesty the district court
concluded that it could not trust Redmond to act with complete good faith in refraining from disclosing
trade secrets and the seventh circuit affirmed the finding. See id.
117. See Terrence P. McMahon et al., Inevitable Disclosure: Not So Sure in the West, NAT’L L.J.,
May 12, 1997, at C35.
118. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1266, 1270. The court observed that PepsiCo had not brought a
“traditional trade secrets case, in which a former employee has knowledge of a special manufacturing
process or customer list and can give a competitor an unfair advantage by transferring the technology
or customers to that competitor.” Id. at 1270. In affirming the lower court’s injunction, however, the
court reasoned that while PepsiCo’s was not a traditional claim, it nevertheless fell within the realm of
trade secret protection. Id.
119. See Lyerla, supra note 89, at 11.
120. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269. Without addressing the likelihood of irreparable harm, the
court simply held that “a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating
that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” Id.
121. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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the lower court’s injunction without discussing irreparable harm, the Seventh
Circuit potentially minimized a former employer’s burden of proof in
inevitable disclosure proceedings.122
V. PUBLIC POLICIES INVOLVED IN INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Courts addressing the doctrine of inevitable disclosure recognize that two
conflicting principles of law are entailed in any examination of this doctrine:
freedom of employment verses commercial morality.123 On one side of the
spectrum, an individual should have the right to change his employment
whenever he so desires, as the court noted in Allis-Chalmers.124 Although an
employee cannot “take with him confidential, particularized plans, or
processes developed by his employer,” he should be “free to take with him
general skills and knowledge acquired during his tenure with his former
employer.”125 The court in AMP noted that an individual maintains a
fundamental right to follow and pursue his particular occupation.126 The
122. It is true that the district court, when enforcing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, did discuss
irreparable harm. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94-C6838, 1996 WL 3965, at *29-30 (N.D. Ill.
Jan 2, 1996). Like the Seventh Circuit, however, the district court potentially lessened the plaintiff’s
burden of proof. By observing that “[i]n cases such as this, involving threats to trade secrets and
confidential information, courts readily presume irreparable injury from a showing that the protectible
interest at stake is imperiled by a defendant’s conduct.” Id. at *29. It is interesting to note that when
making this assertion, the district court cited AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1206 (7th
Cir. 1987). See PepsiCo, 1996 WL 3965, at *29. In AMP, the Seventh Circuit observed that in cases
involving a covenant not to compete, courts do not require a showing of irreparable harm. See 823
F.2d at 1206. The court in AMP clearly stated that “[t]his principle, however, has no application in
cases where the employer has not sought contractual protection” (in the form of a covenant not to
compete). Id. In AMP, the plaintiff claimed that irreparable harm was to be presumed upon the
showing of a protectible business interest. See id. The court, however, explicitly rejected this claim and
held that “[i]n cases where there is no contract restricting a former employee’s competition with his
employer, the Illinois courts have always required a showing of irreparable harm absent injunctive
relief.” Id. In light of AMP, it would appear that the district court in PepsiCo misplaced its reliance on
AMP when asserting that courts readily presume irreparable harm upon a showing of a protectible
business interest.
123. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
652-53 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (considering both freedom of employment and commercial morality when
determining an inevitable disclosure claim).
124. See id. The court noted that “[i]ndeed it is inevitable that some of the knowledge acquired
while in the former employment shall be made available to the new employer, and courts will not
deprive the employee of the right to use the skill that he developed through the years.” Id. at 653.
125. AMP, 823 F.2d at 1202.
126. See id. See ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 49 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971) (holding that a person
employed in a particular field cannot be forced to expunge from his mind all of the general skills,
knowledge, and expertise acquired through his experience. The court also declared that restraints
cannot be lightly placed upon an employee’s right to compete in the area of his greatest worth). See
also Millard Maintenance Service Co. v. Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“[A]n
individual has a fundamental right to pursue a particular occupation for which he is trained.”);
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268 (observing that while trade secret law acts to protect commercial morality
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doctrine of inevitable disclosure runs contrary to this fundamental right
because it can greatly limit an employee’s ability to change jobs and compete
in the market area of his greatest worth. Because of the severe effects an
inevitable disclosure injunction can potentially have on an employee, several
commentators have argued that courts should refuse to recognize the doctrine
as a viable legal theory.127
On the other side of the spectrum, however, courts have also observed
that principles of commercial morality require courts to protect owners of
trade secrets.128 Courts must afford protection to employers who invest
substantial amounts of time, money, and resources to develop secrets that
give that employer a competitive advantage.129 Even in the absence of a
covenant not to compete, employers have a legitimate business interest in
ensuring that their trade secrets are not disclosed by former employees who
work for their competitors. As the court noted in duPont, trade secrets
deserve reasonable protection regardless of the legal label attached to that
protection.130 The doctrine of inevitable disclosure promotes industry
innovation because it ensures that an employer’s hard fought competitive
trade secrets will not be widely disseminated by former employees.
VI. PROPOSAL
Because of the importance of these two competing principles, courts must
strike a balance between an employee’s freedom of employment and an
employer’s interest in trade secret protection. The strong public interest in
promoting industry innovation necessitates that courts should indeed adopt
and to encourage invention and innovation, the same law should not prevent workers from pursing
their livelihoods when assuming new employment).
127. See Johanna L. Edelstein, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure of
Trade Secrets, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 736 (1996) (asserting that the court’s decision in
PepsiCo sets a dangerous precedent). See also Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable
Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 812 (1999) (proposing that courts should
consider findings of “unavoidable disclosure,” a “likelihood of disclosure,” or a “chance of disclosure”
as an alternative to the inevitable disclosure doctrine); Suellen Lowry, Note, Inevitable Disclosure
Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519, 535-44
(1988) (proposing that courts should view cases of threatened disclosure under a concurrent property
doctrine); Matheson, supra note 14, at 165 (asserting that the doctrine of inevitable disclosure only
should be applied “in determining whether to enforce an otherwise valid non-compete agreement.”).
128. See Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 653 (observing that in addition to employee mobility,
courts must also consider the law of unfair competition, in which courts seek to enforce “increasingly
high standards of fairness or commercial morality” in order to “protect the owner of information
obtained through the ingenuity and effort of its employees, and its expenditures of time and money”).
129. See ILG Indus., 273 N.E.2d at 396.
130. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 437
(Del. Ch. 1964).
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the doctrine of inevitable disclosure as a viable legal theory. However, the
equally strong public interest in protecting an employee’s “fundamental
right”131 to pursue his profession mandates that courts, when considering a
claim of inevitable disclosure, limit such claims. This Note proposes a three-
part test courts should adopt for evaluating the validity of inevitable
disclosure. This three-part test balances an employee’s freedom of
employment against an employer’s interest in trade secret protection. First,
courts must examine such claims with the same exacting scrutiny courts
employ when reviewing a covenant not to compete.132 Second, if a court
finds that a former employee will indeed inevitably disclose trade secrets, the
court should grant an injunction only if it can be limited to comport with the
requirements of reasonableness that courts demand of covenants not to
compete.133 Third, if a court finds it can create a reasonable injunction, that
injunction should be contingent upon consideration from the former
employer to the former employee.
In the first step of the proposed test, courts’ scrutiny of inevitable
disclosure should parallel scrutiny of covenants not to compete. In other
words, a court should use exacting scrutiny when considering (1) whether a
trade secret exists; (2) whether the disclosure of that trade secret is inevitable,
and (3) whether the damage caused by that disclosure is indeed irreparable.
Finally, because an injunction would restrain an employee’s fundamental
right to pursue his vocation, courts should require a former employer to
prove each of these three elements by clear and convincing evidence.134 First,
to prove the existence of a trade secret, courts should require a former
employer to make an exact showing of what trade secrets are imperiled by
the former employee’s departure.135 Courts should employ the definitions
contained in either the Restatement (First) of Torts136 or the Uniform Trade
131. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965) (noting that a
covenant not to compete must be “reasonable as between the parties, and not injurious to the public”).
See also Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829, 836 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (noting that it is the
duty of a trial court when in effect writing a covenant not to compete to construct it in a reasonable
fashion).
134. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (finding by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of trade secrets, the threatened disclosure of trade secrets,
and irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction).
135. In AMP, the court continued in its examination of a claim of inevitable disclosure despite the
fact that the former employer had not identified any particularized trade secrets actually at risk. See
AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 119, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987). Upon such a failure, a court should go
no further in an examination of an inevitable disclosure claim.
136. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See supra note 27 and accompanying
text for the Restatement’s definition of “trade secret.”
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Secrets Act137 when determining the existence of a trade secret. Second, to
prove the inevitability of disclosure, courts should compel the former
employer to make a specific showing of why an employee will inevitably
disclose such a trade secret. Indeed, courts should impose the onerous burden
of an injunction on an employee only upon a showing that it will be virtually
impossible for the former employee to perform his new job duties without
disclosing trade secrets.138 Third, to prove the irreparable damage of
disclosure, courts should demand that the former employer make a specific
demonstration of how it will be irreparably harmed in the event of that trade
secret’s disclosure. This harm should be such that the potential economic loss
to the plaintiff would not be ascertainable in terms of money damages.139
If these three factors are met, a court should proceed to the second part of
the proposed test: the court should grant an injunction only if such an
injunction can be crafted to comport with the same three factors of
reasonableness that courts require of covenants not to compete:
reasonableness in restraint of activity, geography, and time.140 Because an
inevitable disclosure injunction is essentially a court-crafted covenant not to
compete, it only makes sense for a court to draft an injunction that places
reasonable restraints on these three factors. While some courts have
addressed one of these factors in granting an injunction,141 all courts should
be required to state explicitly the manner in which its injunction will only
place reasonable restraints upon activity, geography, and time.
If a court does find that it can create a reasonable injunction, the court
should proceed to the third part of the proposed test: the court should grant
the injunction on the condition that the former employer give the former
employee consideration for that injunction. Again, an inevitable disclosure
137. Uniform Trade Secret Act § 1(4) (1990). See supra note 29 and accompanying text for the
Act’s definition of “trade secret.”
138. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng’g Co., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654
(E.D. Mich. 1966) (granting an injunction after finding that it would be virtually impossible for the
defendant to perform his job duties to the best of his ability without disclosing his former employer’s
trade secrets). See also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
139. Emery Indus., 202 U.S.P.Q. at 833 (finding that the disclosure of the plaintiff’s trade secrets
by the defendant would “cause the plaintiff irreparable damage, in that it will cause the plaintiff
damage which will not be ascertainable in terms of money”); see, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 432 (Del. Ch. 1964) (finding that the threatened
disclosure of the plaintiff’s trade secrets would cause damage that were not adequately compensable in
damages).
140. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
141. See Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 654-55 (granting an injunction that still allowed the
defendant to work for his new employer, but just not in a capacity that would involve the designing of
distributor pumps). See also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming
an inevitable disclosure injunction that was to last for only five and a half months).
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injunction is essentially a judicially-crafted covenant not to compete.
Therefore, a court should require that an injunction, like a restrictive
covenant, be supported by additional consideration. As mentioned above,
most courts require that in order to be enforceable, a covenant not to compete
entered into after the initial employment contract must be supported by
additional consideration.142 Because an inevitable disclosure injunction can
only be imposed after the termination of the employment relationship,
adequate consideration must be in the form of compensation above the
amount the former employee received as compensation under his or her
previous contract. By requiring a former employer to give some form of
additional consideration, that employer will receive the benefit of a
judicially-crafted covenant not to compete only by giving the consideration
that an employer must typically give to an employee for a covenant not to
compete.143
Using this proposed test, the court in PepsiCo should have placed a
number of restrictions upon its inevitable disclosure injunction. While, the
district court’s injunction was limited in time to five and one-half months,144
the court failed to limit its injunction in respect to activity and geography.
Furthermore, the court also failed to limit its injunction with respect to the
scope of activity. Instead, the court’s injunction prohibited Redmond from
working in any capacity with Quaker Oats.145 The court easily could have
restrained Redmond from working on business plans for Gatorade and
Snapple, but allowed him to develop business plans for any of Quaker Oat’s
wide array of other products.
Finally, the court, out of fairness, should have required PepsiCo to give
consideration for the court’s imposition of an injunction. Because the court
enjoined Redmond from earning his livelihood for almost six months, it
would have been fair and reasonable to require PepsiCo to continue
Redmond’s salary through the length of the injunction. Instead, PepsiCo
received the benefits of a covenant not to compete without ever
compensating Redmond for those benefits, as it would have been required to
do if attempting to enforce an actual covenant not to compete.
142. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
143. See Emery Indus., 202 U.S.P.Q. at 836 (requiring the former employer to pay the former
employee consideration after granting an injunction in the absence of a covenant not to compete).
144. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1272.
145. See id. at 1272.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss1/7
p325 note Harris.doc 09/15/00   4:54 PM
2000] THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 345
CONCLUSION
Due to employers’ legitimate interest in protecting their hard-earned trade
secrets, courts should indeed adopt inevitable disclosure as a viable legal
doctrine. Due to an employee’s fundamental right to pursue their livelihood,
however, courts crafting inevitable disclosure injunctions should impose the
same strict requirements that they impose upon covenants not to compete.
Injunction should be reasonable in restraint of activity, time, and geography
and should require former employers to provide former employees additional
consideration.
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